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But some modern constitutions have instead resolved this tension 
in favour of constitutionalism. Constitutional designers have, in 
both the civil and common law traditions, expressly designated 
certain constitutional provisions unamendable.7 Unamendable 
constitutional provisions are impervious to the constitutional 
amendment procedures enshrined within a constitutional text 
and immune to constitutional change even by the most compel-
ling legislative and popular majorities. They are intended to last 
forever and to serve as an eternal constraint on the state and its 
citizens. Paradigmatic examples of unamendable constitutional 
provisions read, for example, that republicanism “shall not be a 
matter for constitutional amendment,”8 amendments to federal-
ism “shall be inadmissible,”9 or that the secularism of the state 
“shall not be amended, nor shall [its] amendment be proposed.”10 
Let us call these provisions entrenchment clauses.11
Entrenchment, as I see it, serves three purposes. First, entrench-
ment clauses are deployed to preserve certain structural features 
of the state. For instance, an entrenchment clause may preserve 
federalism, republicanism, secularism or some other constitution-
al structure. I call this preservative entrenchment.
Second, in addition to preserving an important element of the 
state, entrenchment may be used to transform the state by help-
ing to paint a portrait of the state not as it is, but as it could 
be. This type of entrenchment clause guarantees a broad spec-
trum of rights and liberties that once were foreign to the state 
but now are new additions to its constitutional vocabulary. I call 
this transformational entrenchment. And third, an entrenchment 
clause may advance the cause of reconciliation between two or 
more previously warring factions which have joined together in 
peace to form a new or reconstructed state. This final type of en-
trenchment – which I call reconciliatory entrenchment – absolves 
members of these factions of prior wrongdoing and renounces all 
future claims to criminal or other penalties.
Although constitutional states avail themselves of entrenchment 
in the service of purposes that some may deem laudable,12 en-
trenchment clauses nonetheless violate the fundamental promise 
of constitutionalism. They undermine the legitimacy of constitu-
tionalism by throwing away the key to unlock the handcuffs that 
constitutions attach to the wrists of citizens. There is something 
therefore quite unsettling about entrenchment clauses. They deny 
citizens the democratic right to amend their own constitution and 
in so doing divest them of the basic sovereign rights of popu-
lar choice and continuing self-definition, all of which makes en-
trenchment clauses deeply troubling for democratic theory, and 
doubly troubling for democratic practice.
A constitution is a window into the soul of the citizenry, a mir-
ror in which citizens should see themselves and their aspirations 
The highest ambition of democracy is therefore to 
 reflect civic preferences through majoritarian participa­
tory politics. 
bstract: This article makes three contributions to the lit­
erature on constitutional change. First, it reinforces the 
theoretical foundations of constitutional entrenchment by 
defining the spectrum of constitutional permanence. Second, it offers 
an original taxonomy of entrenchment clauses, including preserva­
tive, transformational and reconciliatory entrenchment. Third, in 
concluding that absolute entrenchment undermines the participatory 
values that give constitutionalism its meaning, it proposes an alterna­
tive to entrenchment: the entrenchment simulator. Whereas entrench­
ment clauses prohibit constitutional amendment, the entrenchment 
simulator provides a promising alternative that both embraces the 
expressive function of entrenchment and remains consistent with the 
promise of constitutionalism.
Introduction1
The advent of the written constitution has given rise to an endur-
ing tension in constitutional statecraft, pitting constitutionalism 
against democracy.2 Constitutionalism strikes a decidedly antago-
nistic posture toward democracy, restraining democracy by fasten-
ing handcuffs on its exercise and imposing limits on its expression. 
Whereas democracy celebrates the limitless horizons of collective 
action, constitutionalism takes a more skeptical view of popular 
movements, moderating its enthusiasm for active citizenship with 
careful vigilance for the dangers of majoritarianism. That is the 
very function of countermajoritarian constitutional concepts like 
bills of rights, judicial review and the separation of powers.
Democracy, in contrast, rejects this tyranny of the counterma-
joritarian minority and aspires to break free from the chains that 
constitutions shackle around it. For democracy, legitimacy flows 
neither from natural law nor moral truth but only from the freely 
given consent of the governed. The highest ambition of democ-
racy is therefore to reflect civic preferences through majoritarian 
participatory politics.
Constitutional architects have constructed innovative constitu-
tional devices to palliate the tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy. Their function is to insulate majoritarian popular 
will from judicial invalidation. Some of these devices confer upon 
legislatures the power to limit the scope of judicial review.3 Others 
narrow the range of judicial authority.4 Still others have emerged 
organically in the course of the judicial process.5 What unites all 
of them is their purpose: to signal to citizens that it is citizens 
themselves – and not the institutions of the state – who possess 
the sovereignty to chart the constitutional course of the state.
Perhaps no constitutional mechanism more mightily captures this 
power of sovereignty than the constitutional amendment proce-
dures enshrined in a constitutional text.6 Indeed, the authority to 
amend the constitution is the best democratic answer to the en-
during tension in constitutional statecraft between constitution-
alism and democracy because the rules governing constitutional 
amendment unmistakably resolve this tension in favour of de-
mocracy – by giving citizens the key to unlock their constitutional 
handcuffs.
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expressly to remove what that provision enshrines – for instance 
a legal principle, social or moral value, governmental structure or 
political rule – from the parameters of the customary constitu-
tional field of play.
Degrees of Permanence
Entrenchment is a matter of both degree and kind.20 There are dif-
ferent stages of entrenchment ranging in increasing rigidity from 
provisional to permanent entrenchment. Just as a constitutional 
provision may be entrenched, so too may a law. Conventional 
laws are subject to legislative revision or repeal in the regular legis-
lative process by the default rule of simple majority. But a legisla-
ture may entrench a law by requiring special legislative majorities 
or other unconventional decision rules to amend or repeal it. By 
imposing a higher threshold for amending that entrenched law, 
the legislature sets it apart from conventional laws. Likewise, a 
similar distinction applies to constitutional provisions. Entrench-
ing a constitutional provision is to require special procedures to 
amend or revise the content of that entrenched constitutional 
provision. Whereas a constitution may, as a default rule, require 
a special legislative or popular majority, or both, to amend one of 
its provisions, amending an entrenched constitutional provision 
would entail something qualitatively or quantitatively more than 
the default rule demands.
We may conceptualise entrenchment on a sliding scale of the type 
of legislative and/or popular majorities required to consummate a 
revision to an entrenched provision, be it a legislative or constitu-
tional provision. At its core, then, entrenchment is a measure of 
permanence. Perhaps an illustration of the stages of entrenchment 
will help sharpen precisely what it means to say that there exist 
different degrees of entrenchment.
Let us therefore posit an ascending scale of entrenchment per-
manence consisting of five separate stations: (1) legislative non- 
entrenchment; (2) legislative entrenchment; (3) conventional 
constitutional entrenchment; (4) heightened constitutional en-
trenchment; and (5) indefinite constitutional entrenchment. Let 
us also stipulate that we find ourselves in a presidential system 
where the national bicameral legislature must pass laws by a ma-
jority vote of both houses and in which the constitution may be 
amended by a supermajority of each house of the national legisla-
ture, as well as a majority of the subnational legislatures.21
Beginning at the lowest end of the scale, we find a conventional 
law on a conventional subject passed by the bicameral legislature. 
To revise or even to repeal this law would require nothing out 
of the ordinary: a conventional law passed by a majority of the 
bicameral legislature will suffice. We may refer to this lowest level 
as simply legislative non­entrenchment.
Next, the second station of least permanence is occupied by an 
unconventional law passed by a conventional legislature. The law 
is unconventional because the legislature deems its subject matter 
sufficiently important as to insist that any effort to revise the law 
must muster more than a simple majority of the bicameral legis-
lature. Perhaps the law concerns something of peculiar historical 
reflected, precisely because it is citizens themselves who should 
give continuing shape and content to their constitutional text. 
Entrenchment, in contrast, short-circuits this fundamental prem-
ise of the larger promise of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism 
– and its attendant constitutional amendment rules and other in-
novations designed to palliate the tension between constitution-
alism and democracy – should preserve for citizens the powers of 
self-definition and redefinition that give democracy its meaning. 
Loughlin puts it well when he declares that a constitution is “not a 
segment of being but a process of becoming.”13 Yet entrenchment 
presupposes the contrary: that the essence of a constitution must 
be frozen into permanence.
In the following section, I will explain and illustrate the idea of 
constitutional entrenchment. I will then propose an alternative 
to entrenchment clauses that I call the entrenchment simulator. In 
contrast to entrenchment clauses that render their amendment 
a constitutional impossibility, the entrenchment simulator pro-
vides a promising alternative that both embraces the expressive 
function of entrenchment clauses and remains consistent with the 
promise of constitutionalism. I will close with a few concluding 
thoughts about the enduring tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy.
Constitutional Entrenchment
Ordinarily, the text of a constitution is subject to evolving inter-
pretations. This should come as no surprise insofar as a constitu-
tion is often drafted in expansive language whose terms, standing 
alone, can neither prescribe nor proscribe a particular course of 
action. Accordingly, the text undergoes a continual evolution in 
constitutional meaning manifesting itself as formal or informal 
interventions in the organic development of the constitution. 
These interventions, which either arrest or quicken the pace of 
constitutional change, take the form of constitutional amend-
ments inscribed into the text of the constitution.14
Amending the constitution usually demands an extraordinary 
confluence and sequence of events launched by political insti-
tutions, traditionally either legislatures,15 heads of state,16 social 
forces like popular movements17 or less obvious – though no less 
influential – coils of constitutional change like courts.18 In the 
normal course of affairs, therefore, a constitution is susceptible 
to episodic revision consistent with the rules of constitutional 
amendment located in the constitutional text.
But not all constitutions are created equal. Some constitutional 
states enshrine constitutional provisions that are not subject to 
either regular or periodic amendment. They are unamendable. By 
unamendable, I do not mean that constitutional provisions are 
practically or virtually unamendable as a result of particularly on-
erous amendment formulae.19 I mean to identify these entrenched 
provisions quite literally as fully resistant to the constitutional 
amendment procedures outlined in the text of the constitution 
insofar as they may not ever be lawfully amended – even if citizens 
and legislators achieve the requisite majorities commanded by the 
constitution. To entrench a constitutional provision is therefore 
A constitution is a window into the soul of the citizenry, 
a mirror in which citizens should see themselves and 
their aspirations reflected, precisely because it is citizens 
themselves who should give continuing shape and cont­
ent to their constitutional text.
[Entrenchment clauses] undermine the legitimacy of 
constitutionalism by throwing away the key to unlock 
the handcuffs that constitutions attach to the wrists of 
citizens.
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significance to the nation. Given its importance, the law would 
be subject to higher threshold for amendment: a supermajority of 
the bicameral legislature. I refer to this second station as legislative 
entrenchment.
The third level of entrenchment in our sample sliding scale of 
permanence is a constitution. Let us posit that the drafters of this 
constitution, having had the foresight to prepare for the contin-
gency that their constitution may require some modifications over 
the course of its duration, enshrined an amendment formula in 
the text of the document. The constitution stipulates that amend-
ing the constitution, perhaps to respond to changing social and 
political conditions, requires two conditions: the approval of a 
supermajority of the bicameral national legislature and the con-
sent of a majority of the subnational legislatures. In my taxonomy, 
this third station is called conventional constitutional entrenchment.
What follows this third level of entrenchment is what we might 
consider a superconstitutional provision requiring even more ex-
acting conditions for amendment. The drafters may have deemed 
certain constitutional provisions particularly noteworthy or vital 
to the design of the state, in which case they may have set those 
provisions apart from the other constitutional provisions. Perhaps 
the drafters of the constitution believed that the rules of executive 
selection were so deeply constitutive of the state as to warrant spe-
cial solicitude in the text of the constitution. Imagine, therefore, 
that the founding drafters established a special rule to amend 
this particular constitutional provision. Instead of requiring a 
supermajority of the bicameral national legislature and a ma-
jority of the subnational legislatures, any amendment to this 
superconstitutional provision would demand the approval of 
a supermajority of both the national legislature and the sub-
national legislatures. This fourth station of entrenchment is 
conspicuously more rigorous than the third, and of course far 
more exigent than the two other foregoing stations. I call it 
heightened constitutional entrenchment.
This brings us to the fifth station in our ascending scale of en-
trenchment. As we intensify the degree of entrenchment from 
the first station through the fourth, the fifth and final station 
is permanence. Assume here that the founding drafters of the 
constitutional text were so convinced of the importance of a 
given constitutional provision that they chose to shield that 
provision from any future effort either to amend it or to re-
move it entirely from the constitution. Just as we can conceive 
that certain constitutional provisions that may be deemed of 
greater consequence than others, we may certainly conceive of 
constitutional provisions that are thought to be of such great 
consequence to the state as to warrant making them wholly 
immune to the amendment procedures enshrined in the con-
stitutional text. These would include provisions that, in the 
view of the founding drafters, are special provisions which far 
surpass the solemnity of the superconstitutional provisions 
warranting heightened constitutional entrenchment. Perhaps 
the founding generation regarded certain constitutional struc-
tures, values or principles as so fundamental to the existence 
and identity of the state that they charted the unusual course 
of carving out a special class of unamendable constitutional 
provisions. What makes them special is that no measure of 
legislative or popular approval – not even unanimity among 
all institutions of the state in concert with the freely expressed 
wishes of the citizenry – would be sufficient ever to change 
these unamendable provisions. On our ascending scale of en-
trenchment, we might call this fifth and most uncompromising 
type of entrenchment indefinite constitutional entrenchment.
Entrenching Permanence
My focus in these pages is just that: indefinite constitution-
al entrenchment, which I shall henceforth refer to simply as 
entrenchment. The notion of entrenchment raises fascinating 
questions about the purpose of constitutionalism – and also 
about its promise – and challenges us to think critically about 
the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. 
What is it about constitutions, for example, that gives them their 
force of reason? Does a constitution derive its legitimacy from lib-
eral democratic principles, the consent of the governed, or should 
we revere a constitutional text because it displaces the seat of sov-
ereignty from citizens to another more legitimate site? I suspect 
that the most compelling answer draws from each of these, and 
still other themes.22
Constitutionalism is an institution that at once celebrates and 
undermines democracy. On the one hand, constitutionalism is 
firmly rooted in popular will insofar as it aggregates and subse-
quently crystallises the disparate needs, demands, and aspirations 
of citizens. But, on the other hand, insofar as it takes possession 
of the sovereignty of citizens, constitutionalism is an affront to the 
most basic principle of democracy: the power to define and rede-
fine oneself and to shape and reshape the contours of the state.
Entrenchment, more than any other constitutional device, illus-
trates how constitutions undermine democracy. This of course 
raises the question: what is democracy? I am sympathetic to 
Samuel Issacharoff’s definition: democracy refers to a system of 
self-government in which legitimate authority derives from the 
freely expressed will of citizens expressing their views either direct-
ly or indirectly.23 I therefore adopt procedural democracy, in con-
trast to substantive democracy, as my baseline understanding of 
the concept. Procedural democracy concerns itself with the pro-
cess by which citizens make decisions about their collective future 
as members of the state.24 Substantive democracy concerns itself 
with the values that underpin the actual decisions that citizens 
make.25 In this respect, the former orients itself toward the deci-
sional input and the latter, the decisional output.28 This was the 
very basis of John Hart Ely’s process-based theory of democracy,27 
which, in my view, captures the essence of democratic legitimacy. 
Democracy and its attendant institutions demand that citizens 
be given every opportunity to participate in the procedures for 
settling on, and ultimately setting, the trajectory of the state.28
What underlies my view of constitutionalism is therefore that 
popular choice is a value worth defending. Popular choice may 
admittedly depart from the commonly cited substantive values of 
Constitutionalism is an institution that at once celebra­
tes and undermines democracy.
Perhaps the founding generation regarded certain 
constitutional structures, values or principles as so 
fundamental to the existence and identity of the 
state that they charted the unusual course of carving 
out a special class of unamendable constitutional 
provisions.
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liberal democracy. But just as fairness, equality, and due process 
are first order values that are integral to modern civil society, pop-
ular choice should likewise occupy a privileged position because it 
is the very act of deliberation, reflection and ultimately choosing 
that gives democracy its meaning. Without choice and the right 
to exercise it, we detract from the purpose of joining together in 
the shared venture that is a community, be it a village, territory, 
nation or state.
Yet, procedural democracy on its own has proven to be an insuffi-
ciently strong basis upon which to stand up a new constitutional 
state.29 Procedural democracy, to paraphrase Daniel Markovits, 
has had to bow to the mercy of the substantive values of democ-
racy30 and to accept that it is ill-equipped to address the needs 
of modernity. And perhaps with reason because the dangers of 
privileging process over substance are familiar to us all, and they 
serve as a frightening reminder that choice does not always pro-
duce righteous outcomes. We need only look to history, some of it 
alarmingly recent, for proof that citizens should not always be en-
trusted with the power of free choice because there is little assur-
ance that they will act in the larger interests of justice and virtue. 
Nazism in Germany,31 apartheid in South Africa32 and Jim Crow 
laws in the United States33 are but three vicious manifestations of 
majoritarianism.
That is precisely why constitutional drafters opt so wisely to re-
strict popular choice. By erecting barricades to guard against the 
menace of majoritarianism, constitutions and their attendant 
counter-majoritarian institutions aim to neutralise the dangers 
of majoritarianism, namely the popular predisposition to actu-
alising short-term preferences over long-term investments, the 
inclination toward concrete benefits over abstract ideals, and the 
subjugation of minority rights to majority will.34 It is, therefore, 
one thing to hold in high esteem the value of democratic popu-
lar choice, but quite another to set it as the definitive standard 
against which other values are measured. This common practice 
– the subordination of process to substance – is now standard 
procedure in the task of constitutional design.35 Citizens have be-
come accustomed to – and if they have not, they should resign 
themselves to – restrictions on their capacity to choose their own 
course, both as individuals and as members of a community, be-
cause it is the only way to neutralise the self-interest that informs, 
and perhaps more accurately constrains, our choices. And so it 
makes eminent sense to limit the scope of popular choice.
But to fully deny citizens any form of popular choice in design-
ing and redesigning their very own constitution is another matter 
altogether. And it is similarly qualitatively different from – and 
significantly more objectionable than – denying citizens the right 
to speak through their elected representatives on matters of every-
day legislative affairs. In my taxonomy of degrees of entrench-
ment, this latter example would correspond to the second level of 
entrenchment, pursuant to which a legislature passes a law that 
can be amended or repealed only with a special majority of legis-
lators. Legislative entrenchment, as it is called, as opposed to con-
stitutional entrenchment, has given rise to an engaging exchange 
among constitutional scholars, some arguing that one legislature 
may bind a subsequent legislature and others arguing the con-
trary.36 The contemporary debate derives from the foundational 
work of the great English constitutional theorist, Albert Venn 
Dicey, which has since been refined by his modern counterpart, 
H.L.A. Hart. Both Dicey and Hart help illuminate competing 
notions of legislative sovereignty: the first incarnation of sov-
ereignty granting a later Parliament the continuing sovereignty 
from which it may claim the right to overrule an earlier one; 
and the second placing Parliaments across the ages on an equal 
footing such that no one body may bind another.37
Whether an earlier legislature may bind a future legislature in-
vokes significantly lower stakes than whether a prior body of 
citizens may irreversibly bind a subsequent body of citizens 
against its will. Citizens acting as constitutional amenders may 
undo legislative entrenchment, but legislative entrenchment 
should not trump constitutional amendment. Legislative en-
trenchment admittedly compromises sovereignty. But it is a 
secondary, and indeed lesser, form of sovereignty that we may 
call mediated sovereignty, which refers to the people themselves 
acting through their duly elected legislative delegates. In con-
trast, constitutional entrenchment goes much further. First, 
constitutional entrenchment does not compromise mediated 
sovereignty; it instead constrains direct sovereignty, which refers 
to the people themselves acting of their own volition in their 
own name, unfettered by the bureaucratic and political hurdles 
that representative democracy presents. It is therefore the purest 
form of sovereignty imaginable, the very apex of constitution-
al legitimacy and legitimate authority. Second, constitutional 
entrenchment does not stop at simply compromising that sover-
eignty, as one might characterise the consequence of legislative 
entrenchment. Constitutional entrenchment does something 
far more grave and much more severe than legislative entrench-
ment: it extinguishes sovereignty.
Constitutional entrenchment also runs contrary to the promise 
that constitutionalism augurs for citizens. Constitutionalism is 
an institution that should reflect how citizens see themselves 
and their state – precisely because it is citizens themselves who 
should breathe ongoing life and meaning into their constitu-
tion. A constitution is a constitution only if it retains for citizens 
the right to define and redefine themselves and their state as 
they deem best. If the constitution sequesters this fundamental 
right of self-definition from citizens, then a constitution cannot 
be what it is intended to be – a continuing autobiography, a 
project of discernment and an evolving self-portrait.
Some states strip their constitutional text of the very essence 
of constitutionalism. They entrench constitutional provisions 
A constitution is a constitution only if it retains for 
 citizens the right to define and redefine themselves 
and their state as they deem best.
Without choice and the right to exercise it, we detract 
from the purpose of joining together in the shared ven­
ture that is a community, be it a village, territory, nation 
or state.
If the constitution sequesters this fundamental right of 
self­definition from citizens, then a constitution cannot 
be what it is intended to be – a continuing autobio­
graphy, a project of discernment and an evolving self­ 
portrait. 
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against amendment, in so doing handcuffing the wrists of their 
citizens and leaving them unable to escape their constitutional 
shackles. For that is precisely the effect of entrenchment on citi-
zens: it transforms them from citizens into subjects, reminiscent 
of days long past when democracy was but a dream envisaged by 
heroic revolutionaries preparing to stand up against their imperial 
overlords. Mobilising in pursuit of a new social charter to govern 
how to relate to the state, and how to engage with themselves, cit-
izens birthed the radical notion of a text that would enshrine their 
rights and liberties against infringement by the state. But the text 
itself was not cast in iron. It was instead left open and receptive to 
social and political change – discrete or grand changes that would 
occur as a result of either organic evolution or deliberate revision 
– on the implicit if not explicit understanding that it was not, nor 
could ever be, the text itself that was sacred. What was understood 
to demand reverence as sacrosanct was instead the source of the 
text’s legitimacy. And back then, as today, there is but one singular 
basis of legitimacy and of legitimate authority: popular choice.38
That is the core of constitutionalism. And entrenchment under-
mines that critical core of constitutionalism. As the emblematic 
embodiment of the repudiation of popular choice, entrenchment 
fails not because it freezes for some period of time a particular 
feature or features of the state39 – that is, after all, a legitimate 
function of a constitution – but rather because entrenchment 
freezes a constitutional provision indefinitely.40 Entrenchment 
suppresses popular choice to the detriment of citizenship and nar-
rows the range of possibilities that citizens envision for themselves 
and their state. Entrenchment, as it exists in constitutional states 
around the world, from the Americas to Africa, from Europe to 
Asia, works a devastating harm on the constitutional soul of cit-
izens. For by shielding constitutional provisions against amend-
ment, entrenchment takes possession of the fundamental civic 
right of self-definition that is an avenue into the meaning and 
virtue of democracy.
The Entrenchment Simulator
No right is more constitutive of citizenship than the power to 
amend the constitution, for a constitutional amendment derives 
from the highest of all democratic values: popular choice. The 
process of amending the constitution strikes at the heart of what 
it means to be a people whose disparate members have joined 
together in a common venture to define themselves as a collective 
and to build and sustain the apparatus of their state. 
To withhold from citizens the power of constitutional amend-
ment is to withhold more than a mere procedural right. It is 
to hijack their most basic of all democratic rights. Nothing is 
more democratically objectionable than dispossessing citizens of 
the power to rewrite the charter governing the boundary sepa-
rating the citizen from the state, and citizens from themselves. 
Sequestering this democratic right commandeers the sovereign-
ty that gives democracy its meaning and throws away the key to 
unlock the handcuffs that constitutions fasten to the wrists of cit-
izens.
The Expressive Function of Entrenchment
There is good reason, though, to design constitutions so as to 
handcuff the wrists of citizens. Citizens are, after all, self-interest-
ed individuals whose first instinct is more often inward-looking 
and self-regarding than oriented toward the larger, and more pub-
lic, interests of the community. At their best, constitutions mould 
disparate persons into members of a joint undertaking who ulti-
mately join together to become, and to see themselves as, citizens 
of the state.
Constitutions achieve this high ambition by facilitating the devel-
opment of social conscience, and of a social consciousness, among 
the citizens of the state in three ways. First, by setting down mark-
ers distinguishing proper from improper conduct both by the 
state toward citizens, and by citizens toward themselves. Second, 
by clearly demarcating the respective spheres of jurisdiction for 
the institutions of the state. And, third, by constructing the arche-
type of a just or ideal society to which citizens and the institutions 
of the state alike should aspire.
Entrenchment aims – though falls wide of the mark in its attempt 
– to fulfil the function of creating a model society. It fails in its 
mission because it lacks legitimacy insofar as its dictates derive 
not from the freely given consent of the people but from the often 
unwelcome and self-imposed will of the past. It is this disconnect 
– between the aspiration to shape shared values and the coercion 
to adopt those values – that dooms entrenchment to failure. Nev-
ertheless, entrenchment expresses an important message not only 
to those bound by the terms of the written constitution but like-
wise to those outside observers curious to discern the bases and 
principles upon which stand that particular constitutional state.
In addition to setting apart a legal principle, social or moral value, 
governmental structure or political rule from other constitutional 
provisions, entrenchment also conveys the symbolic value of that 
principle, value, structure or rule41 – the symbolic value that the 
constitutional entrenchers attributed to it precisely by entrench-
ing it.
This purely expressive function of entrenchment doubles as the 
core of its merit: deploying symbolic statements – as opposed to 
using force or other forms of compulsion – to set or correct so-
cial norms.42 That purposeful symbolism is the subtle, yet par-
adoxically the most powerful, virtue of entrenchment. For by 
identifying a constitutional feature of statehood as unamendable, 
entrenchment signals to citizens just as it does to observers what 
matters most to the state by fixing the palette of non-negotiable 
colours in its self-portrait.
The expressive function of entrenchment is not unlike the ex-
pressive function of constitutionalism or constitutional law. As 
Ashutosh Bhagwat writes, when judges interpret the constitution, 
they proclaim the values that constitute the constitutional cul-
ture of the state even as they shape those values.43 Thus when 
courts engage in constitutional judicial review, they give “concrete 
expression to the unarticulated values of a diverse nation.”44 Yet 
entrenchment does more than merely express a symbolic state-
ment of unarticulated values. It makes an unvarnished definitive 
By shielding constitutional provisions against 
 amendment, entrenchment takes possession of the fun­
damental civic right of self­definition that is an avenue 
into the meaning and virtue of democracy.
To withhold from citizens the power of constitutional 
amendment is to withhold more than a mere procedural 
right. It is to hijack their most basic of all democratic 
rights.
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statement about the values that do and should bind citizens to 
the state, and citizens to themselves. There is nothing unarticu-
lated about entrenchment. Quite the contrary, the very fact of 
entrenchment removes any spectre of doubt as to what should be 
the values of the state.
An important distinction emerges in constitutional scholarship 
on this point. Scholars distinguish between the expressive and 
communicative functions of a constitutional text.45 The former 
– expression – refers to an act or omission that unintentionally 
conveys meaning while the latter – communication – refers to 
an actual intent to convey meaning. Expression may as a con-
sequence of this distinction occur and exist on its own without 
communication. For instance, a person may act or fail to act in 
such a way as to express an affinity for someone or something but 
that person may not have intended to communicate that affinity. 
Therefore expression, which is subject to evolving interpretations 
from third party observers, is a gesture dissociated from intent. 
In contrast, communication is a gesture whose purpose is indeed 
to convey an intent and whose meaning is usually settled by the 
communicator herself. Insofar as the very nature of entrenchment 
entails a similarly constraining intent to communicate the impor-
tance of a principle, value, structure or rule, entrenchment goes 
beyond simply performing an expressive function. Entrenchment 
openly marries expression with communication by, first, clearly 
identifying a constitutional provision as unamendable and, sec-
ond, just as clearly manifesting the intent to convey the meaning 
behind the decision to have made that provision unamendable.
That constitutional entrenchment merges expression with com-
munication raises two concerns, each of which, on its own, divests 
entrenchment of the legitimacy that is the lifeblood of constitu-
tionalism. First, the effect of blending expression and communi-
cation is to weaken the potent persuasive subtlety of the expressive 
force of entrenchment. Standing alone, expressive entrenchment 
seeps inconspicuously into the consciousness of citizens, slowly 
but assuredly taking root in the collective spirit of the citizenry. 
But when this intention is communicated outright, our intuition 
raises red flags about the motives behind the wish to instil the val-
ues entrenched in the constitution. Much better to use the consti-
tutional text to make expressive statements about rights and val-
ues, and therefore to allow citizens to reach their own conclusions 
about the worth of particular values and which ones they wish to 
adopt as their own, than to impose them from the top downward.
Second, the risk inherent in authorising the state or founding 
drafters to reveal their intent to impose values on a class of citizen 
subjects – as is the case when expression and communication are 
combined – is that the chosen values may not find a welcome 
home in the individual hearts and the shared mores of those citi-
zens. The costs incurred in entrenchment exceed its benefits when 
what we seek to entrench stands in conflict, and if not in conflict 
then in some tension, with existing or future beliefs or convic-
tions. This echoes the stakes in the tug of war pitting constitu-
tional structure versus political culture, the former mistakenly as-
suming that it can actually dictate the content of the latter. There 
is a grave danger in presuming that a constitutional structure, for 
instance entrenchment, can shape political culture, specifically so-
cial values. Indeed, the continuing dialogue about this very matter 
– a dialogue that is unlikely to achieve resolution any time soon46 
– demonstrates only one point beyond doubt: that constitutional 
structure and political culture enjoy a bi-directional relationship 
in which the form and fate of one is linked to the fate and form 
of the other. 
Therefore, the critical institutional design challenge to breathing 
legitimacy into constitutional entrenchment is to find a way to 
isolate its redeeming expressive function from its unproductive 
communicative function. And that is just what I hope to do. With 
the entrenchment simulator that I shall unveil in the pages to 
follow, I will endeavour to achieve twin goals. First, I will aim to 
capture the salutary expressive essence of entrenchment within 
the entrenchment simulator. And second, I will seek to disengage 
entrenchment from its problematic consequence of constraining 
popular choice and pre-empting self-definition. The immediate 
purpose of the entrenchment simulator is to signal important so-
cial pre-commitments. But its larger purpose is to create sufficient 
space within which those pre-commitments may evolve over time, 
as of necessity they must.
The Challenge of Constitutional Democracy
But before I proceed to introduce the entrenchment simulator, 
we must first return to the question that began this inquiry: what 
is the proper balance between constitutionalism and democracy? 
This is of course harder said than done. Despite the richness and 
diversity of constitutional texts around the world, it is difficult 
to identify a constitutional state whose constitutional text has 
successfully managed to solve the enduring tension between con-
stitutionalism and democracy. Granted, it may be too much to 
expect of constitutional designers to do anything but modestly 
lessen that tension. After all, scholars have long recognised its in-
evitable persistence,47 some even arguing that there is merit to the 
tension itself and that we should not resolve it.48
If successful efforts to assuage the tension are few and far be-
tween, quite the contrary is true of constitutional texts that veer 
too sharply toward either constitutionalism or democracy. Begin 
first with the former. Above, I have chronicled and illustrated how 
constitutional states privilege constitutionalism at the expense of 
democracy by entrenching discrete constitutional provisions. But 
there exists something far worse than that: constitutional states 
which entrench the entire constitutional text – each and every 
constitutional provision – instead of a mere single provision or a 
few provisions.
To find what is perhaps the most egregious example of a con-
stitutional text that elevates constitutionalism so high above de-
mocracy as to render democracy virtually meaningless, we must 
look to Mexico. True, Mexico permits amendments to its consti-
tution provided that the amendment is approved by a two-thirds 
supermajority of the national legislature and a majority of the 
subnational legislatures.49 But that is the extent of the revisions 
or additions permitted by the constitution. Anything more than 
By identifying a constitutional feature of statehood as 
unamendable, entrenchment signals to citizens just 
as it does to observers what matters most to the state 
by fixing the palette of non­negotiable colours in its 
self­portrait.
Constitutional structure and political culture enjoy a 
bi­directional relationship in which the form and fate of 
one is linked to the fate and form of the other.
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discrete amendments to the text is expressly forbidden insofar as 
the constitution does not contemplate, and indeed rejects, the 
possibility of a new constitution ever being created to replace the 
existing one – even if a popular revolution ensues.50 The Mexican 
Constitution consequently makes revolution illegitimate and de-
prives it of any force of reason before one is ever launched.
That the Mexican Constitution tilts so militantly in favour of con-
stitutionalism as to outlaw revolution – which is the very apex of 
democratic mobilisation and popular will – should concern any-
one infused with the democratic spirit and otherwise committed 
to the core democratic principles of popular choice and self-defi-
nition. The importance of this point cannot on any conceivable 
grounds be overestimated because its implications are just that 
colossal. For the Mexican Constitution takes a radical position 
that effectively holds time and space forever constant, never per-
mitting the kind of political change that has made possible the 
great democratic transformations in human history, namely the 
constitutional birth of the United States in 1787,51 the founding 
of the first French Republic in 1789,52 or the social renewal of 
South Africa in 1996.53 These possibilities are foreclosed to Mex-
icans, even if conditions in their state deteriorate so intolerably as 
to require broad popular mobilisations to reclaim the nation from 
a despot or illegitimate rulers. There may, therefore, be no better 
example than the Mexican Constitution to demonstrate how the 
reverence for written constitutionalism has in some constitutional 
states suppressed democracy and prevented citizens from exercis-
ing their legitimate authority to change or chart the constitutional 
course of their state.
But let us also recognise that constitutional states can just as well 
commit the contrary though equally objectionable offence, that 
is to say, privileging democracy at the expense of constitution-
alism.54 Switzerland is the paradigmatic model of a state where 
procedural democracy is the highest value. Long regarded as the 
modern cradle of direct democracy,55 Switzerland has accordingly 
conferred upon itself a constitution that grants unreviewable pow-
er to its citizens, placing no matter of law, rights or policy beyond 
their reach. Citizens may vote in referenda to overrule legislation, 
revise and reverse matters of social policy, reconfigure the organs 
of the state, and engage in wholesale constitutional change.56 And 
Swiss citizens may do all of this with a bare majority.57
That Swiss citizens have the final say in constitutional matters is 
not out of the ordinary. American citizens, for example, retain 
determinative control over their constitution, provided they can 
muster the requisite supermajorities to successfully navigate the 
amendment process.58 However, what makes the Swiss model 
so exceptional in its inclination toward majoritarian democracy 
and in its disinclination toward constitutionalism is that, quite 
unlike the United States and other leading liberal democracies, 
Switzerland does not allow judicial review of federal legislation.59 
This is consistent with the theme that runs through the entire 
Swiss public constitutional apparatus: majoritarian public choice. 
Whereas courts typically function as the supervisory force against 
the threat of majoritarianism in liberal democracies, courts in 
Switzerland have no such role. No check, therefore, constrains 
the majoritarian wishes – or more accurately, the impulses – of 
Swiss citizens.
This unbridled Swiss majoritarianism is just as alarming as the 
Mexican constitutional entrenchment is restrictive. Both do equal 
parts injustice and harm to popular choice, the former because it 
fails to test the strength and sustainability over time of that choice, 
and the latter because it gives insufficient respect to it. And that is 
the harm in subscribing indiscriminately to either constitutional-
ism or democracy without recognising that each has strengths that 
compensate for the weakness of the other.
Our challenge, then, is to make peace between constitutionalism 
and democracy. Resolving the tension between them will require, 
first, building on their respective strengths and compensating for 
their respective weaknesses and, second, fashioning a constitu-
tional structure that will make real the promise that both hold for 
humanity. This, in my view, is no small feat insofar as it demands 
the design of a constitutional device exhibiting three components: 
(1) entrenchment; (2) expression; and (3) an escape hatch.
Before I outline each of these three items, let me say a short word on 
each. First, the text need not necessarily entrench a legal principle, 
social or moral value, governmental structure or political rule. But 
if it does, it should not resort to indefinite constitutional entrench-
ment. The text should instead entrench that principle, value, struc-
ture or rule in a way that corresponds to the fourth station of en-
trenchment – which I call heightened constitutional entrenchment60 
– pursuant to which the constitutional text demands special pro-
cedures (which depart from the default constitutional amendment 
procedures) to amend that entrenched item. Second, it is preferable 
to enshrine some degree of entrenchment beyond the third station 
of entrenchment – which I call conventional constitutional entrench­
ment61 – because of the expressive and symbolic value that only a 
special form of entrenchment can convey. And since the fifth and 
final station – indefinite constitutional entrenchment – is much too 
constraining, only the fourth station remains as a possibility.62
Finally, we cannot resolve the tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy merely by tilting the scales less so in favour of 
constitutionalism. We must instead make a very real effort to ac-
tualise the underlying premise of procedural democracy while, 
nonetheless, guarding against the menace of majoritarianism. We 
can achieve this balance if, alongside the use of some degree of 
constitutional entrenchment, we grant citizens an escape hatch 
to pull if they wish to extricate themselves from the handcuffs 
that entrenchment wraps around their wrists. That escape hatch 
is provided by the fourth station of entrenchment – heightened 
constitutional entrenchment – precisely because it does not consign 
citizens to life under indefinite constitutional entrenchment but 
rather allows them to exercise their popular choice. It is true, how-
ever, that citizens exercise their popular choice under constrained 
conditions, but this restriction on democracy is both politically 
useful and socially vital in a liberal democracy.
This unbridled Swiss majoritarianism is just as alarming 
as the Mexican constitutional entrenchment is restric­
tive. Both do equal parts injustice and harm to popular 
choice […].
We cannot resolve the tension between constitutiona­
lism and democracy merely by tilting the scales less so 
in favour of constitutionalism. We must instead make 
a very real effort to actualise the underlying premise 
of procedural democracy while, nonetheless, guarding 
against the menace of majoritarianism.
Intergenerational Justice Review
1/2017
25
Designing Constitutional Democracy
The entrenchment simulator achieves each of these three objec-
tives. It is a constitutional structure whose aim is to reconcile 
constitutionalists with democrats by pooling the virtues of con-
stitutionalism and democracy, and by mitigating their respective 
limitations. The entrenchment simulator creates a new constitu-
tional arrangement whose function is to govern both the content 
and timing of constitutional amendments. Were constitutional 
states to adopt this entrenchment simulator, they would achieve 
the expressive benefits of constitutional entrenchment while not 
compromising the popular choice and self-definition underlying 
procedural democracy.
Three elements form the basic apparatus of the entrenchment 
simulator: (1) interim induction; (2) constitutional rank; and (3) 
sequential approval. The first, interim induction, seeks to respond 
to the challenge that confronts constitutional designers when they 
endeavour to introduce, and in so doing to entrench, new values 
into the national consciousness. Constitutional designers may 
often face resistance from citizens, who may for various reasons 
be unreceptive to new values; for instance, a new founding com-
mitment to preserving federalism or unitarism; presidentialism 
or parliamentarism; republicanism or monarchism; religion or 
secularism; or a commitment to transforming the state through 
civil and political rights or through electoral procedures, or even 
a new founding commitment to reconciliation. In order to allow 
sufficient opportunity for the new values to take root in the cit-
izenry, the entrenchment simulator mandates a period of induc-
tion – measured from the date the entrenchment comes into force 
– during which those newly entrenched values enjoy absolute 
immunity from constitutional amendment. Not even unanimity 
may overturn the entrenched provision.
Induction serves an important function. Insofar as there are long 
odds facing any attempt to deploy constitutional structure to 
shape political culture, induction helps facilitate the process of 
infusing new values into the lives and being of citizens. Induction 
– by which I mean a period of acculturation during which new 
constitutional values introduced by entrenchment are assimilated 
– gives those new values a chance to take root and, once rooted, 
to remain in the consciousness of citizens. Consider it a manda-
tory trial run whose animating hope is that, by the end of the 
designated induction stage, what may have been viewed initially 
as controversial or foreign values imposed by elites ultimately be-
come ingrained in the quilt of state and the fabric of citizenship 
– so deeply that they become constitutive of nationhood, just as 
the constitutional framers had hoped.
Without this period of courtship between the text and the citizen, 
a constitutional state may never be fully capable of making a clean 
break from the past and charting a new direction. With the possi-
bility looming of a constitutional amendment returning the state 
to days past or changing constitutional clothes yet again, there 
is no assurance that the vision of the framers will ever be given a 
real opportunity to take hold. But induction creates and cultivates 
that opportunity.
Just how long this period of induction should last before citizens 
may once again reclaim their right to amend the constitution is a 
difficult matter. On the one hand, limiting the induction period 
to a few years may be too short a time span because it would be 
insufficiently long to inculcate citizens with new values. On the 
other, extending induction to much more than an entire genera-
tion, say over twenty years or so, may be too long because it would 
approximate too closely the perilous conditions of constitutional 
entrenchment we have canvassed above.
Looking to those constitutional states currently imposing a com-
parable though not quite similar temporal restriction against 
amending new constitutional provisions, we may conclude that 
they generally ban amendments anywhere from five to ten years 
from the date of enactment.63 Afterwards, the constitutionally 
protected provision reverts to normal status and may be freely 
amended according to the conventional rules of constitutional 
amendment. Five or even ten years seems like much too little time 
to allow new values to permeate the state and its citizens. How-
ever, one generation or more seems right, although each consti-
tutional state availing itself of the entrenchment simulator could 
of course tailor this time period to its own indigenous needs and 
conditions. Still the principle remains clear: induction – which en-
trenches a constitutional provision for only an abbreviated period 
of time – serves the purpose of breathing new values into citizens, 
fully consistent with what constitutional entrenchers hope will 
transpire when a people confers a new constitution upon itself.
But induction on its own is insufficient to help right the balance 
between constitutionalism and democracy. Without more added 
to our design, an entrenched constitutional provision will revert 
to being a conventional constitutional provision after the desig-
nated time has elapsed following the interim induction period. 
The entrenchment simulator addresses this problem with its sec-
ond component: constitutional rank. To understand the notion of 
constitutional rank, we must return to the fourth station of consti-
tutional entrenchment: heightened constitutional entrenchment.
What motivates constitutional designers who adopt indefinite 
constitutional entrenchment is the conviction that certain fea-
tures of the state are more important, and if not more important 
then more constitutive, of the state and its citizens. For that is the 
effect, either real or perceived or both, of entrenching a legal prin-
ciple, social or moral value, governmental structure or political 
rule. Constitutional designers resort to indefinite constitutional 
entrenchment to establish a hierarchy of constitutional provisions, 
which represents an implicit rank ordering of constitutional val-
ues. Indefinitely entrenched provisions are regarded by the fram-
ers as not only qualitatively different but more valuable than the 
conventionally entrenched provisions – and those framers hope 
that these entrenched values will ultimately come to be seen as 
such both by citizens and third-party observers. This is the inevi-
table consequence of indefinite constitutional entrenchment. By 
entrenching a particular feature of the constitution, constitutional 
designers envelop that feature in a certain measure of legitimacy – 
founding legitimacy, as opposed to continuing popular legitimacy 
(though the two are not mutually exclusive) – which results in 
elevating that feature above all other conventionally entrenched 
constitutional provisions. The upshot of indefinite constitutional 
entrenchment is that it creates tiers of significance among consti-
tutional provisions. That is what I mean by constitutional rank.
Induction serves an important function. Insofar as there 
are long odds facing any attempt to deploy constitutio­
nal structure to shape political culture, induction helps 
facilitate the process of infusing new values into the 
lives and being of citizens.
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Using the concept of constitutional rank, the entrenchment 
simulator establishes tiers of escalating significance among con-
stitutional provisions. But it does so in a way that retains the 
amendability of those constitutional provisions designated as 
most important in the constitutional order. Recalling that the en-
trenchment simulator rejects indefinite constitutional entrench-
ment as illegitimate and imprudent, the alternative that presents 
itself is heightened constitutional entrenchment. Two positive 
benefits flow from inviting constitutional states to rely on height-
ened constitutional entrenchment in their constitutional design. 
First, heightened constitutional entrenchment exercises the same 
expressive function as indefinite constitutional entrenchment, 
signalling both to citizens and to third party observers what is 
thought to be most important about the state: its design and its 
citizens. Second, it goes beyond simply distinguishing between 
the two tiers of entrenchment – indefinite constitutional en-
trenchment and conventional constitutional entrenchment – that 
we discern in constitutional states deploying indefinite constitu-
tional entrenchment. Rather, heightened constitutional entrench-
ment folds within itself an infinite possibility of tiers of entrench-
ment that constitutional designers can use to distinguish among 
several tiers of constitutional provisions. Those possibilities range 
from conventional constitutional entrenchment to multiple in-
carnations of heightened constitutional entrenchment, but they 
exclude indefinite constitutional entrenchment.
We might imagine, for example, a hypothetical presidential state 
designating four tiers of constitutional provisions.64 The fourth, 
and lowest, tier could include the basic structural provisions of 
the constitution, namely providing that the chambers of the bi-
cameral national legislature consist of 300 representatives in the 
lower house and 100 senators in the upper house. This bottom 
tier would be subject to the default rules of constitutional amend-
ment mandated in the constitutional text. Let us posit, in this 
instance, that the default rule for amending the constitution re-
quires two-thirds concurrence of each chamber as well as two-
thirds concurrence of the subnational legislatures.
Moving upward along our constitutional hierarchy, the third 
tier of constitutional provisions would require a more exacting 
threshold for amending the constitution – say, three-quarters 
concurrence of each chamber and two-thirds of the subnational 
legislatures – and consist of constitutional provisions thought by 
the framers to be more important than the simple distribution of 
seats in the bicameral legislature, for instance term limits on pres-
idential service. In the second tier, which could include, just as an 
example, a constitutional provision requiring the president and 
the bicameral national legislature to pass a balanced budget each 
year, the rule for amending the constitution would be tougher 
even still: three-quarters approval of each legislative chamber and 
three-quarters of the subnational legislatures.
Finally, the first and highest tier of constitutional rank in our 
hypothetical could conceivably include a rule that is so deeply 
interconnected with the founding moments of the state – con-
sider perhaps the secular nature of the state – that it requires an 
even more exigent quantum of popular and legislative approval: 
three-quarters approval from both the bicameral national legisla-
ture and the several subnational legislatures as well as three-quar-
ters approval of the citizenry in a referendum.
Constitutional rank, then, is the incarnation of heightened con-
stitutional entrenchment. For when one invokes the latter, one is 
by implication declaring that there exists an echelon of merit ac-
cording to which each constitutional provision may be classified. 
If a principle, value, structure or rule is regarded as minimally 
more important than a conventional constitutional provision but 
less important than the most important constitutional feature of 
the state, then it should be categorised according to the lowest 
level of heightened constitutional entrenchment – the lowest con-
stitutional rank within that degree of entrenchment. Conversely, 
if it is viewed as markedly more important than a conventional 
constitutional provision and minimally less important than the 
most important constitutional feature of the state, then it should 
be categorised according to the highest level of heightened con-
stitutional entrenchment – otherwise understood as the highest 
constitutional rank within that degree of entrenchment.
Constitutional designers may accordingly enjoy the sweet without 
suffering through the sour if they adopt this strategy, because it 
bestows upon the constitution and the state the expressive bene-
fits of entrenchment while not weakening the democratic core of 
the citizenry. By highlighting the richness of entrenchment pos-
sibilities that lie between conventional constitutional entrench-
ment and indefinite constitutional entrenchment, heightened 
constitutional entrenchment and its incarnation in the notion of 
constitutional rank demonstrates the merit of this second feature 
of the entrenchment simulator.
Now, having reached the third element of the entrenchment sim-
ulator, the entire mechanism begins to take final shape. If induc-
tion serves the purpose of creating a safe harbour within which 
constitutional framers may endeavour to shape the contours of 
and instil new values into citizens, and if ranking allows fram-
ers to express both implicitly and explicitly what they deem most 
constitutive of statehood and citizenship, then the third element 
– sequential approval – is the mechanism through which citizens 
may manifest their intention to free themselves from the hand-
cuffs that the constitutional entrenchers have wrapped around 
their wrists. It is, in short, the escape hatch that citizens can pull 
to liberate themselves from the past and to propel themselves into 
their own self-defined collective future.
Sequential approval requires that citizens express their freely-given 
views on whether to amend a particular constitutional provision 
falling within a class of heightened constitutional entrenchment. 
But sequential approval requires that citizens express their consent 
to such an amendment more than once, in at least one initial 
and one subsequent confirmatory vote, and according to a clearly 
delimited majority defined in the constitutional text. Although 
the actual majority threshold would presumably vary from one 
constitutional text to another – as would the number of times 
Heightened constitutional entrenchment folds within 
itself an infinite possibility of tiers of entrenchment that 
constitutional designers can use to distinguish among 
several tiers of constitutional provisions.
If a principle, value, structure or rule is regarded as mini­
mally more important than a conventional constitutio­
nal provision but less important than the most import­
ant constitutional feature of the state, then it should be 
categorised according to the lowest level of heightened 
constitutional entrenchment.
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tional designers may designate, with the use of heightened consti-
tutional entrenchment, different tiers of constitutional provisions 
on the basis of their respective significance to the state; and third, 
a requirement of sequential approval, which imposes both tempo-
ral and voting threshold obstacles to amending those entrenched 
constitutional provisions. Each of these three elements, taken to-
gether, helps us address the enduring tension between constitu-
tionalism and democracy.
To recap the ground we have covered, let us reflect on the concern 
that prompted our inquiry: many constitutional states have, to 
their liking and with several different devices, resolved the tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy in favour of constitu-
tionalism, most notably by indefinitely entrenching constitution-
al provisions beyond the reach of the citizenry. The consequence 
of prohibiting citizens from exercising their right to amend their 
own constitution is to divest citizens of their right to self-defi-
nition and popular choice, in essence forever tying their hands 
with no recourse ever to free themselves from their predicament. 
We should of course expect that constitutions would handcuff 
citizens, in so doing preventing them from taking actions that the 
state, the founding drafters, as well as intervening generations of 
constitutional amenders deem improper in that particular society 
at that particular time. But indefinite constitutional entrench-
ment does not simply handcuff citizens – something that all con-
stitutions do, as they should. Indefinite constitutional entrench-
ment throws away the keys to those handcuffs, consigning citizens 
into the permanent custody of the entrenching generation.
Constructing a mechanism to return those keys to citizens is no 
easy task. But the entrenchment simulator may hold promise for 
meeting that challenge. In confronting the tension between con-
stitutionalism and democracy, the entrenchment simulator strikes 
a compromise between, on the one hand, the unforgiving rigidi-
ty that is characteristic of indefinite constitutional entrenchment 
and, on the other, the public autonomy that democratic liberty 
entails. Three points are useful by way of summary.
First, the entrenchment simulator recognises the importance of 
entrenchment. But it privileges heightened constitutional en-
trenchment over indefinite constitutional entrenchment because 
the former keeps the keys to self-definition within the reach of 
citizens, however complicated the labyrinthine rules to amend a 
provision subject to heightened constitutional entrenchment may 
be. Second, the reason why the entrenchment simulator looks 
so favourably upon some measure of entrenchment is precisely 
because of the expressive value that entrenchment entails. Fixing 
common civic objectives and anchoring the state in shared so-
cial and political values is exceedingly important to creating and 
cultivating a community of citizens. The entrenchment simulator 
latches onto expressiveness as the vital means to that critical end.
Finally, the entrenchment simulator acknowledges that it is an 
event of high moment to undertake the process of unentrenching 
a constitutional provision whose drafters thought it was so foun-
dational as to merit entrenchment in the first place. That is why 
that citizens would be required to reach that particular majority 
in different votes separated by a constitutionally defined period of 
time – the principle remains the same despite any wrinkles that 
may exist among constitutional states adopting the entrenchment 
simulator.
Let us deconstruct the following hypothetical constitutional rule 
mandating sequential approval: “In order to be approved, an 
amendment to [provision x] shall require a supermajority of eligi-
ble citizens to vote in favour of the amendment on two separate 
occasions separated by five full years as of the day of the first vote.”
We should note three things about this hypothetical rule. First, 
the threshold for amendment is high: a supermajority of citizens. 
Second, the confirmatory vote occurs only in the event of a suc-
cessful supermajority vote in favour of the amendment at the ini-
tial vote. Third, the confirmatory vote is separated from the initial 
vote by five full years, which would mean in most constitutional 
democracies that there had been intervening legislative or execu-
tive elections, or both.
This is significant for three reasons: namely that the supermajority 
threshold tests the strength and intensity of popular will for an 
amendment; that the five-year waiting period would verify the 
sustainability over time of the popular choice to amend the con-
stitution; and that the intervening elections would have afforded 
electoral candidates the opportunity to voice their opinion on the 
amendment at a time when citizens would have been most likely 
to engage attentively to the ongoing political discourse. Of course, 
this hypothetical constitutional rule is just that – hypothetical.65 
Nevertheless, it lays bare the usefulness of sequential approval.
Recall our baseline premise: we must mitigate the menace of ma-
joritarianism, which typically manifests itself in mob mentality 
that prefers to act on emotion in the immediacy of the moment 
rather than to take the necessary time to deliberate carefully and 
critically about the proper course of action. Requiring sequen-
tial approval helps ensure that the popular will accurately reflects 
the considered and thoughtful judgment of the citizenry instead 
of its most primal predispositions, which is precisely the source 
of our discomfort about majoritarianism. Quite apart from the 
temporal element of sequential approval, combining time and 
threshold makes it even harder to amend a provision that has been 
entrenched pursuant to heightened constitutional entrenchment 
because it requires a special majority to do so. That citizens in 
favour of reversing the entrenched provision must meet the des-
ignated special majority threshold more than once is yet another 
way to mitigate majoritarianism. For were citizens to form the 
requisite majorities successfully twice over the designated period 
of time, it would rebut the presumption of the transient and fickle 
nature of citizens – the very vices that raise concerns about ma-
joritarianism.
That is the entrenchment simulator. It consists of three distin-
guishable elements: first, an interim induction period, during 
which new values or principles are given time to integrate into 
the constitutional culture of the state and its citizens; second, a 
constitutional ranking arrangement, pursuant to which constitu-
Sequential approval […] is the mechanism through 
which citizens may manifest their intention to free 
themselves from the handcuffs that the constitutional 
entrenchers have wrapped around their wrists.
But indefinite constitutional entrenchment does not 
simply handcuff citizens – something that all consti­
tutions do, as they should. Indefinite constitutional 
entrenchment throws away the keys to those handcuffs, 
consigning citizens into the permanent custody of the 
entrenching generation.
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the entrenchment simulator adds a temporal element to the task 
of amending an entrenched constitutional provision. To guard 
against the perils of majoritarianism, the entrenchment simula-
tor calls for special majorities to express their collective wish to 
unentrench an entrenched provision – not only on one occasion, 
for instance a single referendum conducted on a single day, but 
rather on multiple occasions over different periods of time. This 
last wrinkle strives to ensure both that, in the interest of constitu-
tionalism, a sustained special majority has sufficient time to delib-
erate on the enormity of amending an entrenched constitutional 
provision and that, in the interest of democracy, citizens retain 
determinative decision-making authority to shape their state.
Conclusion
Perhaps the tension between constitutionalism and democracy 
will never quite fade. Constitutionalism and democracy are, after 
all, each anchored in opposing visions of statehood and citizen-
ship. The former orients itself toward substantive principles that 
can often be achieved only by pinching down on the procedural 
values that give meaning to the latter. And the latter privileges civ-
ic participation in the very democratic processes that the former 
constrains with rules about who may participate, when and how 
they may do so, and toward what ends. It therefore seems una-
voidable that constitutionalism and democracy would sometimes 
clash, and that the former would prevail in some contexts just as 
the latter would reign in other contexts.
What is not inescapable, however, is that one would so domi-
nate the other as to reduce it to a mere shell of itself. Yet that is 
precisely what results from entrenchment. When constitutional 
drafters entrench constitutional provisions against amendment by 
even the most compelling popular or legislative majorities, the 
consequence is to cast constitutionalism in the leading role and 
to relegate democracy to the background. Entrenchment invites 
constitutionalism to breathe in all of the available oxygen, and 
in so doing it chokes democracy into submission. For by divest-
ing citizens of the fundamental civic right to popular choice and 
self-definition, entrenchment undermines the promise of citizen-
ship and the possibilities of constitutionalism.
The entrenchment simulator begins the critical work of reversing 
the tide of constitutionalism in constitutional states. The pur-
pose of the entrenchment simulator is not necessarily to elevate 
 democracy over constitutionalism. It is more modestly to right the 
balance that has undeniably shifted away from democracy since 
the advent of the written constitution. Indeed, if anything may be 
said about the preferences betrayed by the entrenchment simula-
tor, it is that it cedes to constitutionalism much of the terrain once 
governed by democracy. But with good reason, given the inherent 
dangers of majoritarianism that modernity has demonstrated with 
sharp and disconcerting clarity.
There, nevertheless, remains much work left to do to strike the 
proper balance between constitutionalism and democracy. The 
road ahead is admittedly long. But the entrenchment simulator 
holds promise for resolving this enduring tension – a tension that 
continues to define the stakes in constitutional law and theory 
to this very day. Only by holding firm to foundational principles 
of statehood and citizenship – namely the freedom of popular 
choice, the right to self-definition, and the legitimacy of public 
authority – may we ultimately achieve a comfortable consensus 
on how rigidly constitutionalism may constrain democracy and 
what democracy must surrender to constitutionalism.
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